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Abstract 
In The Age of the World Picture, philosopher Martin Heidegger claims that scientific 
representations do not reduce themselves to pure appropriations of what they present. Rather, 
they convey investigations that confine being to rules of appropriation. Those rules govern how 
natural science accesses phenomena. The choice of natural science as the predominant mode of 
representation of reality entails what Heidegger calls a process of objectification 
(Vergegenständlichung). In his Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger questions the tribute paid by the 
sciences of the mind to the logic of the natural sciences, and stresses that Freud, by thinking of 
the mind as a machine driven by instinctive powers, assigns to human phenomena the objective 
features set by the natural sciences. This paper purports to show that Winnicott, by formulating 
a theory of personal maturing, disagrees with the objectifying requirements of the natural 
sciences. For Winnicott, traditional psychoanalysis uses categories that are inadequate for 
describing the changes babies undergo in the environment that gives them care and attention, 
because its analysis is confined to the field of libido relations. With that in mind, it is not 
possible to speak about human maturation processes using an objectifying language; Winnicott 
stresses (in The newborn and his mother) that “I cannot sacrifice a patient on the altar of 
science”. This paper argues that Winnicott disagrees with the naturalistic imperative, which 
reduces the real to what is objective and places physics as a model for the sciences. The paper 
also broaches on the issue of how far the considerations of Heidegger and Winnicott regarding 
access to human phenomena allow us to discuss the current overwhelming process of 
medicating everyday life. 
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Philosophy of the Federal University of Paraíba (2000) and a PhD of Philosophy of the UNICAMP 
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Colóquio Internacional Winnicott and I International Winnicott Association (IWA) Congress. 
 
 
59 
Key-words: objectification, Heidegger, Winnicott  
 
Resumo: 
No texto A época das imagens de mundo o filósofo Martin Heidegger nos indica que a 
representação científica não se reduz a uma mera apreensão do que se apresenta, ao invés, 
equivale a uma investigação que faz com que o ente se domestique às regras de apreensão, posto 
que “o ataque das regras domina”. Estas regras governam o modo como a ciência natural deve 
acessar os fenômenos. O que está implicado na eleição da representação científico-natural como 
índice hegemônico de acesso ao real é a execução do que Heidegger denomina de processo de 
objetificação (Vergegenständlichung). Na obra Seminários de Zollikon, o filósofo problematiza o 
tributo que as ciências dos fenômenos psíquicos pagam à lógica da pesquisa científico-natural e 
afirma que Freud, ao pensar o psiquismo como um aparelho regido por forças pulsionais, destina 
aos fenômenos humanos pretensões de objetividade afinadas às ciências da natureza.  Com esse 
trabalho pretendemos indicar que Winnicott, ao formular a teoria do amadurecimento pessoal, 
não faz coro às pretensões objetificantes da ciência natural.  Para Winnicott, a psicanálise 
tradicional serve-se de categorias que são incapazes de descrever as trocas que se estabelecem 
entre um bebê e o ambiente que lhe provê cuidados, afinal, reduz sua análise ao campo das 
relações libidinais. Posto que não é possível versar sobre o amadurecer humano munido com uma 
semântica que segue padrões objetificantes Winnicott, no texto O recém-nascido e sua mãe, 
afirma: “não posso sacrificar um paciente sobre o altar da ciência”. Visamos, com esse artigo, 
indicar que Winnicott não faz coro ao imperativo naturalista que reduz o real ao objetificável e 
estabelece a física como a ciência emblemática. Pleiteamos, ainda, tematizar o quanto as 
ponderações de Heidegger e Winnicott em relação ao acesso aos fenômenos humanos nos 
permitem discutir o contemporâneo e avassalador processo de medicalização do cotidiano. 
 Palavras-chave: objetificação, Heidegger, Winnicott 
 
 
This work aims at fostering a dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and 
Winnicottian psychoanalysis. The guiding lines are Heidegger’s criticism of what he 
calls the process of objectifying reality and the resistance we find in Winnicott’s 
psychoanalysis to the logic of the natural sciences. Winnicott’s remarks on human 
phenomena do not echo the imperatives of modern philosophy of reducing all that is 
real to that which is objectifiable and of setting physics as a paradigm for all of science. 
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By refusing to describe human nature from the perspective of a semantics inspired in a 
physicalist language,2 i.e. instead of thinking human psychology in terms of an 
apparatus ruled by drives, Winnicott invites us to contemplate the subtlety and depth of 
the “mother-baby pair”, and sets up alternative readings of the initial human 
phenomena, leading psychoanalysis towards unexplored terrains. Winnicott’s thought 
highlights the need for an extension of psychoanalytic theory backwards. In this paper, 
we indicate how that backwards extension into the more primitive stages of the human 
maturation process is the beginning of a new way of approaching human beings, 
radically different from the one conveyed in Freudian language, which suffers the 
influence of the standards of natural sciences.3 Through a dialogue between Heidegger 
and Winnicott, we question the increasing medicalization of life. More specifically, we 
draw considerations on the imperatives of classifying and medicating schoolchildren 
who allegedly show learning deficits and are for that reason diagnosed as suffering from 
ADHD (Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder).  
 
1. The process of objectifying reality 
 To set up the aforementioned dialogue, we shall begin clarifying Heidegger’s 
reading of the prevailing mode of unveiling of beings. This includes focusing on the 
process of objectifying reality, which is a trait of our contemporary state of affairs. We 
shall use as guide Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars, which contain talks delivered to 
psychiatrists and students during a 10-year period in Zollikon, Switzerland.4  
 To entice an investigative attitude among the participants regarding the 
ontological bases of the sciences of mental phenomena, Heidegger attempted to 
deconstruct the idea – much emphasized among commentators of Freudian 
psychoanalysis – that Freud would have parted ways with the Modern heritage by 
                                                          
2 We shall see below that Winnicott explicitly criticizes a physicalism in Freud’s work. It to be found 
especially in his metapsychology. Freud’s concepts of mental apparatus, drive (Trieb), repression 
(Verdrängung), unconscious, etc. – make use methods analogous to those of physics. On Freud’s 
physicalist heritage, see Loparic (2003, 2005); Fulgencio (2001, 2008); Assoun (1983); and Ribeiro 
(2008). 
3 Freud himself compares his epistemic procedure with the ones used in physics. See Freud (2013 and 
2014). 
4 Upon an invitation by Medard Boss, Heidegger accepted the challenge of lecturing and debating with an 
audience that differed from his ordinary students. This seminar series began on September 8, 1959. On 
that occasion, Heidegger addressed a large audience at the psychiatry clinic of the University of Zurich. 
Soon afterwards, the meetings began to take place at Boss’s house, in Zollikon. See Boss, Preface to 
Heidegger (2001). We shall cite the Zollikoner Seminare referring to the pagination of the original 
edition. 
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positing an unconscious element within the psychological machinery. Heidegger argued 
that by assigning to the psychological realm the claims to objectivity that are typical of 
the natural sciences, Freud placed himself as herald of the process of objectification of 
beings.5 But what does this mean? How can we track down its installation and 
consolidation? To answer those questions, we must first understand what Heidegger 
calls “modification of the presence of entities objectivity”. In his seminar of July 6, 
1965, Heidegger took up the issue as follows: 
Objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] is a definite modification of the 
presence of things. A subject thereby understands the presencing 
of a thing from itself with regard the representedness 
[Vorgestellheit]. Presence is understood as representedness. 
Thereby, presence is no longer taken as what is given by itself, 
but only as how it is an object for me as the thinking subject, 
that is, how it is made an object over and against me. This kind 
of experience of being has existed only since Descartes, which is 
to say, only since the time when the emergence of the human 
being as a subject was put into effect. (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 
129). 
Although the Freudian concept of unconscious seems to create a Narcissistic 
wound in the Cartesian view of man as a thinking subject, Heidegger points out that it 
does not entail a break with attempts of Modernity to apprehend all phenomena 
objectively. By conceiving the mind through an analogy with machines and by positing 
the unconscious as a causal factor of all mental phenomena – dreams, symptoms, 
parapraxes, etc. – Freud proceeded as a natural scientist whose goal was to explain the 
functioning of the mind.6 Freud conceived psychoanalysis’ main step forward as that of 
having treated scientifically a term that had been “manipulated uncarefully” in literature 
and philosophy: the unconscious. Said treatment consisted in determining objectively 
the laws that govern its functioning; thus psychoanalysis “by its researches […] has led 
to a knowledge of the characteristics the unconscious mental which have hitherto been 
unsuspected, and it has discovered some of the laws that govern it” (FREUD, 1996a, p. 
306).  
                                                          
5 On this topic, see Ribeiro (2014). 
6 In the 24 Jan. 1964 seminar, Heidegger stated that Freud observing the psychodynamics of clinical 
phenomena, considers as real and as being, more precisely, as “real and actual” that which “can be 
explained in terms of psychological, unbroken, causal conections between forces”. This statement 
immediately led his students to refer to the well-known physicist Max Planck, who claimed that “only 
that which can be measured is real” (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 7). 
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According to Freud, the view that the mental contains an unconscious element 
allows psychoanalysis to figure among the natural sciences (FREUD, 2014, p. 49). To 
secure its place among the natural sciences, Freud formulated explicitly the laws that 
govern mental life, and addressed rigorously and objectively a concept that in fiction 
and philosophy had been dealt with only tentatively: the unconscious. Hence, Heidegger 
does not hesitate to place Freudian psychoanalysis among the sciences that pay a tribute 
to natural-scientific logic. From this perspective, by making use of terms such as those 
of mental apparatus, drive, homeostatic equilibrium, investment, charge and discharge 
of energy, and others, Freud would be operating an objectification of the mental.7  
By speaking of a “modification of the presence of beings in objectivity”, 
Heidegger refers to the fact that, with Descartes, man achieved the condition of a 
subject. The Latin word subiectum, he says, has not always been synonymous to 
“thinking I”; rather, it was a wide-ranging term that referred everything that is at the 
basis, all that underlies. For this reason, in the book Nietzsche II, Heidegger says that we 
need first to draw apart the term subiectum and the concept of man, because subiectum 
could also apply to “[...] stones, plants, and animals no less than to men” 
(HEIDEGGER, 2007, p. 105). During the Modern era, by becoming subiectum par 
excellence, the “thinking I” becomes “the characterizing element of that which is 
properly already there for representation”, the object (HEIDEGGER, 1992, p.107). In 
the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger states: 
Descartes was looking for a fundamentum absolutum 
inconcussum. But this can only be one’s own I. For only I 
myself am present everywhere, whether I think, whether I doubt, 
whether I wish, or whether I take a position toward something. 
Therefore, when searching for an absolutely secure foundation 
in thinking, the I becomes what “lies-in front” [Vorliegendes] in 
an outstanding sense because it is something indubitable. From 
then on, subject progressively became the term for I. Object 
now became all that stands over against the I and its thinking, by 
being able to be determined through the principles and 
categories of this thinking. (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p.154/144) 
[emphasis added] 
With Descartes, the thinking ego became the ontological basis for all things, 
which attain the condition of objects that one must grasp through clear and distinct 
                                                          
7 Loparic (2005) and Fulgencio (2008) point out how Freud grounded his psychoanalysis on a soil seeded 
by the Kantian project for research on natural sciences and by the epistemology of Ernest Mach. Hence, 
it is quite difficult to maintain that Freud would have parted ways with the objectifying imperatives that 
are typical of Modernity.  
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ideas. According to Zimmerman (1990, p. 262), Descartes placed the ego as the ground 
that provided principles with which one measures the presence (or reality) of all things. 
Hence, “nothing really is unless it can be ‘re-presented’ (vorgestellt) to the subject 
completely by himself according to the rigorous standards of that same subject” 
(ZIMMERMAN, 1990, p. 262). From this perspective, representation is no mere 
apprehension of that which presents itself, of what is there. Rather, it is a form of 
apprehension that captures that which presents itself in a previously secured format. 
This renders beings as something understood not as that which is there, “simply in front 
of”, “before us”. Modernity’s great claim consists in this securing, which domesticates 
being into the rules of clear and objective apprehension, given that the “the attack of the 
rules dominates”.8 Those rules govern the way a subject clearly and distinctly – i.e. truly 
– apprehends “something”. All beings are then equaled to an entity represented by a 
subject. This attack on the entities is the hallmark of the process of objectification, 
which consists in subjecting the totality of beings to the objective domain. This entails 
that nothing can happen, or come to light, which is not determined as an object. 
(HEIDEGGER, 1982, p. 46).  
According to Heidegger (2006), with the process of objectification of beings, the 
man who thinks gives way to the researcher engaged in research programs, who is 
assessed by presenting results and who is “driven by efficiency”. The outcome can be 
detected in the transformation of knowledge into an economic good, in the imposition 
of productivism as a necessary way of being in the world and in the regulation of the 
forms of life by the functionalization of existence. The wonder, which from the 
beginnings of Western civilization, mobilized thought, became a calculating action that 
captures all there is based on rules that objectify. This configuration had Heidegger 
characterizing our age as the “Age of the Technique”. But what does this mean? 
The ontological basis for this phenomenon invites us to understand technique as 
a form of unveiling reality, nature, “all that there is”. Although Heidegger’s remarks on 
technique are quite complex, we are interested here on highlighting the technical device 
that reduces everything to the condition of a deposit (Bestand), a reservoir available for 
                                                          
8 This reasoning is based on footnote 9 of “L’epoque des ‘conceptions du monde’”, where Heidegger 
defines precisely his concept of Vorstellung (representation). See Heidegger (2006, p. 138-145). 
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the cycle of production.9 This is not about understanding technique as a means for 
producing gadgets and equipment, but about understanding it as a way of apprehending 
“all there is” through the condition of the deposit (Bestand). It is a permanent attack on 
beings that converts them into objects for use and for calculations. (LOPARIC, 1996). 
To elucidate this form of unveiling reality through the logic of unending use and abuse 
of “all there is”, an emblematic passage from Heidegger’s conference on The Jewish 
Question, delivered in 1953, is helpful: 
The hydroelectric plant sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic 
pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets 
those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric 
current […]. In the context of the interlocking processes 
pertaining to the orderly disposition of electric energy, even the 
Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The 
hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine river as was the 
old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of 
years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power plant. 
(HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 20) 
 
What interests us in this passage is Heidegger not only alerting how much we 
can transform a river into a mere device for providing electricity for the sake of using 
profitably natural resources, but also unveiling a way of disposing of nature as 
something that is there to be used, processed, and manipulated. Heidegger says it was 
the hydroelectric plant that had the river dammed up into it, and not the other way 
around. But what does this mean? Is it a challenge to the rules of logical thinking, or an 
unsettling and provoking image? By saying something unreasonable, namely, that it was 
the plant that dammed up the river into it, Heidegger is alerting that the river has been 
reduced into the condition of a device for providing energy. It is as if the river could no 
longer simply be there. The river Rhine becomes a deposit, an energy device for the 
hydroelectric plant. Nature, apprehended as Bestand, cannot simply be there without 
being explored! Hence, the river presented by Hölderlin in the hymn The Rhine loses its 
sense because it no longer affords productive qualities; it cannot be unveiled as a natural 
resource. The river “evoked by the work of art” is replaced by the river Rhine of the 
works of engineering and of the tourist industry (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 20). The river, 
deprived of any poetic enchantment, is reduced to a device that can be attached to a 
                                                          
9 Some authors translate Bestand as deposit, other as resourse, and others still as raw material. Despite 
these differences, the sense of something available for use, of something seen only with respect to its 
functionality, remains. We addressed Heidegger’s approach to technique in Ribeiro (2009). 
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hydroelectric plant and its logic of production. The riverbed becomes a device 
functioning for the plant. After all, if machines do not operate in vain, nature will not be 
allowed the possibility of simply being there to enchant us. This logic consists in 
challenging beings to unveil themselves as deposits, resources – whether energy 
resources, financial resources, even human resources.10  
The unveiling of reality that governs the “Age of the Technique” consists in 
reducing all beings to the condition of devices for the constant fulfilling of demands. 
Everything becomes Bestand and as such must be compelled to answer with maximum 
profit and minimum spending (HEIDEGGER, 2001, p. 19). Objectification becomes the 
predominant way of apprehending reality, and from that imperative not even men 
escape.  
Given our brief Heideggerian analysis of the imperatives of objectification 
present in the “Age of the Technique”, we may now ask whether – and to what extent – 
this philosophical diagnosis relates to Winnicott’s psychoanalysis. To be sure, we 
cannot expect a Winnicottian ontological analysis of this process, because philosophical 
flights are not inherent to psychoanalysis. But we may ask whether Winnicottian 
psychoanalysis fits in with the process of objectification of reality; whether Winnicott 
agrees with or resists to that process while thinking about human phenomena.  
 
2. Winnicott and the refusal to objectify human nature 
In “The psychology of madness: a contribution from psycho-analysis” Winnicott 
alerts us to the need to pay attention to the initial stages of human development. He thus 
declares the need for an “extension of psycho-analytic theory backwards” 
(WINNICOTT, 1989vk, p. 95). Backwards extension of the theory towards a study of 
the more primitive stages of maturing does not entail using the semantic arsenal of 
traditional psychoanalysis to speak of the more primitive relations between mother and 
baby. This is not a mere widening of the scope of the phenomena that are to be 
analyzed, but the construction of a language capable of reaching the subtleties of the 
initial mother-baby relation. This entails addressing those initial stages without the 
categories of Freudian metapsychology, which describe human phenomena in terms of a 
play of drives and forces within the mental apparatus. If the analytic horizon is attached 
                                                          
10 We explore further this Heideggerian argument in Ribeiro (2009). 
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to a metapsychological semantics, then the investigation will turn on the question about 
the satisfaction of the drives; in other words, on the how the mental apparatus invests on 
its objects.11 However, if the language for speaking of human phenomena is not hooked 
onto the physicalism that is typical of metapsychology, then human nature and the first 
moments of the baby’s life may be analyzed considering environmental reliability, 
mother’s care, the long journey towards integration, living in his or her body and the 
capacity to relate to shared objects.12 From a Winnicottian perspective, the baby is 
moved by a tendency to mature, and not by drives towards objects of investment. The 
language for describing the initial exchanges between mother and baby cannot be 
reduced to the field of libido relations, but must consider the environment that provides 
care and reliability. The troubles that afflict this initial relation have to do with the 
continuity of being and the quality of the communication, i.e. they are not restricted to 
the appeasement of opposing drives. Hence, Winnicott’s focus is on the baby’s 
maturation process, and not on the polarity of pleasure and displeasure of drives. 
Winnicott is interested in environmental provision and not in the vicissitudes of the 
drives, and for that reason he invites us to pay attention to the mother’s adaptability to 
the baby’s needs, i.e., he invites us to consider “[...] the deep waters of mutuality that 
does not relate directly to drives or to instinct tensions” (WINNICOTT, 1970b [1969], 
p. 199). On the mother’s adaptation, Winnicott states: 
In early psycho-analytic days adaptation could only mean one 
thing, meeting the infant’s instinctual needs. A great deal of 
misconception has arisen out of the slowness of some to 
understand that an infant’s needs are not confined to instinct 
tensions, important though these may be. [...] The language here 
is that the mother ‘does not let her infant down’. (WINNICOTT, 
1965r [1963], p. 83) 
 
The author calls attention to the nature of the language needed to analyze the 
“deep waters of mutuality”, i.e. to describe the silent communication and the mother’s 
care for the baby, if he or she is lucky enough to have a sufficiently good mother. By 
alerting us that such language should not be restricted to the field of instinctual tensions, 
Winnicott indicates the need for considering the environment and its reliability. This 
                                                          
11 See Freud (2013). 
12 This journey is characterized, in environmental terms, as follows: “The facilitating environment can be 
described as holding, developing into handling, to which is added object-presenting. In such a 
facilitating environment, the individual undergoes development which can be classified as integrating, 
to which is added indwelling (or psycho-somatic collusion) and then object-relating.” (WINNICOTT, 
1974, p. 72). 
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implies that by mitigating the role of the environment and by describing the baby from 
an inner psychological perspective, traditional psychoanalysis disregarded achievements 
which cannot happen for a baby; for example, the capacity to desire, the investment on 
external or internal objects, the feeling of reality, and integration. Winnicottian 
psychoanalysis shows us that a careful investigation of environmental provisions is 
unavoidable.  
Winnicott does not presuppose that the baby will enjoy the feeling of being a 
unity, and has us understand that “all the processes of a live infant constitute a going-
on-being, a kind of blueprint for existentialism”. The mother who gives to her baby a 
good enough care during the stages of its absolute dependence “is able to protect her 
infant’s going-on-being” (WINNICOTT, 1965r [1963], p. 82). When referring to the 
initial moments of the baby’s life, the author mentions a “blueprint for existentialism” 
and not a mental apparatus moved by oral drives. By calling into question the use of that 
metapsychological semantics, Winnicott attempts to describe the mother-baby relation 
without falling back onto an objectifying language inspired in the natural sciences. He 
thus states, “The words homeostatic equilibrium again avoid some of the fine points 
which appear before our eyes if we look at this relationship with the care that it 
deserves” (WINNICOTT, 1958n, p. 400).  
If we observe carefully the mother-baby phenomena, we cannot assume that the 
baby initially has any sort of integration that enables him or her to feel alive, real, and 
capable of investing in objects. Hence, it is out of place to speak of discharges and of 
homeostatic equilibrium, rather than of going-on-being and environmental provision. 
One cannot talk about these topics without a language that is free from the constraints of 
natural science. This is why Winnicott says, “I cannot sacrifice a patient on the altar of 
science” (WINNICOTT, 1964c, p. 150). Along the same reasoning, in “Psycho-analysis 
and the sense of guilt”, Winnicott criticizes Freudian analysis for centering the sense of 
guilt on the economics of drives. In that work, Winnicott remarks that we can identify 
an implicit determinism in Freudian analysis, as well as “an assumption that human 
nature can be examined objectively and can have applied to it laws that are known to 
apply in physics” (WINNICOTT, 1958o, p. 20)  
In the passage above, we find a criticism of Freud’s debt to the natural-scientific 
perspective. This allows us to say that Winnicott does not endorse the claims to the 
effect that all that is real can be reduced to what is objective. In Heideggerian terms, we 
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might say that Winnicott does not fit in with those scientists who work as heralds of the 
process of objectification. By refusing to talk about human nature using a 
metapsychological semantics inspired in physics, Winnicott gave us a theory that does 
not objectify reality. By aiming at approaching human phenomena as they show 
themselves to us, Winnicott resists the objectifying domestication that sacrifices patients 
on the altar of science! Those Winnicottian remarks allow us to relate them to 
Heidegger’s thoughts on the objectification of beings. However, we still need to 
indicate how Heidegger and Winnicott connect to the main topic of the 20th 
International Winnicott Colloquium. How are we to relate the issues discussed above 
with the future of psychoanalysis? We believe that an analysis regarding the future of 
psychoanalytic theory and practice as well as of the future of our age cannot set aside 
something that troubles us deeply today: the growing medicalization of all spheres of 
life. In the next section, we attempt to think about that process in the light of a dialogue 
between Heidegger and Winnicott. 
 
3. The medicalization of life and the “altar of science”  
For our brief discussion of the process of medicalization of all spheres of life we 
shall refer to two books: New grasps and old diagnostics in the age of disorders, 
organized by Cecília Collares, Maria Moyses, and Monica Ribeiro (2013), and 
Subsidies for the campaign “no to the medicalization of life; medicalization of 
education” organized and edited by the Federal Board of Psychology (2011-2013). In 
the latter, more precisely in the section on “Medicalization of life: whose interests?”, the 
following information is given: in Brazil, consumption of methylphenidate – a 
substance administered to children and adolescents for treating “attention deficit” – rose 
from 70,000 boxes sold in the year 2000 to 2.000,000 boxes sold in 2010. This placed 
our country as the world’s second largest consumer of that substance, after the United 
States. Distribution13 of methylphenidate by government health care facilities in the last 
five years is up from 43,320 tablets to 1,156,016; an increase of approximately 1,284%. 
Although those numbers speak for themselves, it is important to underscore that 
when speaking of medicalization, we are – according to the definition set by the Federal 
Psychology Board in the document mentioned above – referring to a process that 
                                                          
13 According to ANVISA, distribution is the act of providing medication, pharmaceutical items and the 
like to consumers. See http://www.anvisa.gov.br/medicamentos/conceito.htm   
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changes social, political, and cultural issues into “disorders”, attributing to individuals a 
series of difficulties that place them in the realm of psychiatric pathologies, labels, and 
classifications.  
Given that the huge growth in consumption of the above-mentioned medicament 
refers to an “alleged” disorder that overwhelms the educational context – the ADHD14 – 
we ask whether those numbers and that logic are not at the service of the objectification 
of existence and of the pathologization of students. We believe that those numbers show 
that our age has sacrificed students, in Winnicott’s words, at the altar of science, more 
precisely at the altar of pharmaceutical industry. Many students are swollen by the 
educational model that somehow inflicts on them troubles with reading and writing. But 
the analysis of those difficulties falls squarely on their behaviors and on their bodies, 
more precisely on their brains. School and its methods, teaching and learning 
environment and conditions are excused from any blame in this crusade that hurts the 
educational ideal. Issues pertaining to the relation between the subject matters taught 
and student’s lives, teachers’ work conditions, and obsolete curricula are simply 
ignored. Meanwhile, behaviors that pierce the standards set down by goals for success 
are promptly catalogued and therefore medicated. 
According to the Federal Psychology Board (2011-2013 administration), a 
danger lurks: the heralds of the pathologization of children who cannot learn properly or 
do not behave well at school have begun to claim that medication is a right. The child 
who falls behind in schools must have the right to diagnosis, treatment, and medication, 
and the public health care system must bear burden of funding this process.  
All this seems quite conscientious, but one must pay attention to the fact that 
claims for that right do not question the cataloguing process and the pharmacologization 
of existence, which are at the service of the domestication of student, in other words, at 
the service of a violent calculating rationality that objectifies. From that violence no one 
can escape, not even the characters that inhabit our playful imagination. Hence:  
The “Menino Maluquinho” no longer exists, he has been labeled 
and now receives psychotropic for ADHD; Mafalda is treated 
and her Opposing Defiand Disorder (ODD) has been silenced; 
                                                          
14 Rohde, Barbosa, Tramontina et al (2000) point out that, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, edited by the American Psychiatric Association, the classic triad of 
symptons for ADHD is unattentiveness, hyperactivity and impulsivity. According to the authors, 
regardless of the classificatory system used, children with ADHD are easily identified in schools and at 
home. See: Rohde, Barbosa, Tramontina et al (2000). 
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Xaveco no longer lives up in the skies, he has landed, his 
Attention Deficit has been identified; outspoken and impulsive 
Emília is quiet and contained [...]. Cascão’s case is analyzed and 
debated in the committee in charge of the DSM-5, and there are 
divergences as to whether he suffers from OCD (Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder for dirt) or from Hydrophobia Disorder... 
(MOYSÉS and COLLARES, 2013, p. 44) 
 
Although this has been formulated in a jocose manner, the passage reveals the 
danger we face: that of no longer being allowed to live with people who fall out to the 
dictatorship of the “good” behavior – either in empirical reality or in phantasy. That 
danger presents itself in the form of Laws and Statutes – of all levels of public 
administration – that include services, agreements, and programs for the diagnosis and 
treatment of alleged disorders into the public health care system, especially dyslexia and 
ADHD. The Federal Psychology Board has been calling attention to this change in the 
public policies for education that convey this “benefit”. If those projects are approved 
without qualifications, the public policies for education will begin treating and 
diagnosing all children and adolescents that exhibit difficulties in learning, rather than 
focusing on bettering the quality of the education offered.  
This is a rather broad issue, and we do not have the time now to dwell longer on 
it. Thus, we would like to finish with a few questions: 
1) Is it true that the proposal for creating diagnostic centers within the public 
educational system does not entail – as in Heidegger’s example of the river 
Rhine and the power plant – an inversion of the situation? Not diagnostic centers 
are to be installed in the school system, but rather the school system is to be 
installed in the diagnostic centers. In this case, schools would be, as the river 
Rhine, in the condition of a device feeding the machine that produces 
diagnostics and distributes medicine. 
2) Is it the case that by agreeing uncritically with law proposals that institutionalize 
mechanisms for producing diagnostics and large-scale medicine distribution we 
are not, as Winnicott cautions us, sacrificing students at the altar of science? Or, 
more precisely, at the altar of the market? 
3) Would it not be possible to point out that underlying the imperatives of 
medicalization is the understanding that we are Bestand, resources for turning 
the wheel of the market with maximum profit? In other words, just as a 
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hydroelectric plant must force a river into producing electricity, so too must 
students follow the imperative of re-producing formal knowledge and attain 
maximum school performance! Those who are slow and present deficits in their 
performances should, from that perspective, be diagnosed and medicated.  
4) Is it not the case that by shifting focus to individual students rather than 
questioning the educational context as a whole we are disregarding that an 
analysis of the environmental conditions is unavoidable when human 
phenomena are at stake, as Winnicott advocates?  
I leave you with an invitation to ponder on these issues.  
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